During the breakup of the Soviet Union many countriesreceived their freedom from the ways of a communist past.
With these freedoms,countries like Uzbekistan had to come about with their own political landscapeand decide on how they would continue to organize and enact on governmentalduties. While there was certainly a framework set in place by communist partychief Islam Karimov when he accepted the presidency in 1991, there was still anopportunity for the Uzbeks to implement a more democratic process into thegovernment. We will look at the political regime of the former Soviet republicof Uzbekistan, with attention to the executive, legislative and judicialbranches and how they function, including a look at the presidency and how itinteracts with them to see if this landscape is a viable one for futurestability.
While Uzbekistan as a former Soviet republic has the ability to makechanges, we will see if this is actually happening or is it simply a façade,like we have seen before in Russian politics. Seeing that Uzbekistan is a republicwhich operates under a presidential constitutional system, whereas thepresident is both the head of the government and the head of the state. Inorder to understand this system a little more we will first look at theconstitution of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Constitution accommodates solidadministration, with power to name government and break up assembly. By and by,a dictator state with all power in official and concealment of contradiction. Fromthe earliest starting point of his administration, Karimov stayed submitted inwords to establishing democratic changes. Formally the constitution made apartition of forces among a solid administration, the governing body, and alegal. Practically speaking, be that as it may, these progressions have been toa great extent corrective.
Uzbekistan stays among the most tyrant states inCentral Asia. Despite the fact that the dialect of the constitutionincorporates numerous democratic highlights, it can be superseded by officialdeclarations and enactment, and frequently protected law just is disregarded. Thepresident is the head of state and is conceded preeminent official power by theconstitution.
As president of the military, the president additionally mayproclaim a state of war. The president is empowered to choose the primeminister and full cabinet, also the judges whom represent the three nationalcourts, subject to the endorsement of the assembly, and to choose allindividuals to members of the lower courts. The president likewise has theability to break up the parliament, basically refuting the Oly Majlis’ ability toveto control over presidential selections in a power battle circumstance. Delegatesof legislature are chosen to five-year terms. The body might be expelled by thepresident with the alignment of the Constitutional Court; since that court isliable to presidential arrangement, the expulsion condition weights the powervigorously toward the executive branch. The Oly Majlis orders legislation, thatcould be started by the president, inside of the parliament, by the highcourts, by the procurator general (most noteworthy law requirement official inthe nation), or by the administration of the Autonomous Province ofKarakalpakstan. Other than legislation, global bargains, presidentialdeclarations, and highly sensitive situations likewise should be endorsed bythe Oly Majlis. The national legislation includes the Supreme Court, theConstitutional Court, and the High Economic Court.
Lower court frameworks existat the local, area, and town levels. Judges at all levels are selected by thepresident and affirmed by the Oly Majlis. Ostensibly free of alternate branchesof government, the courts stay under total control of the official branch.
Asin the arrangement of the Soviet time, the procurator general and histerritorial and neighborhood counterparts are both the state’s head indictingauthorities and the central specialists of criminal cases, a setup thatconfines the pretrial privileges of respondents. First, we will look at the overallstructure of the executive branch and its conquest to take out any and allopposition. Karimov has gathered forces that guarantee full strength of the governmentprocedure for whatever length of time that he is president. He selects the PrimeMinister, all individuals from the cabinet, all individuals from the judiciary,16 individuals from the recently shaped Senate, and every provincial official.He likewise has developed or debilitated the tribes that frame the conventionalpolitical texture of Uzbekistan, including the effective clan from Samarkandthat place him in control. Karimov has utilized his immediate control of theNational Security Service as far as possible limiting opposition. The cabinetis an elastic stamp collection of six prime minister deputies, 14 ministers,and the heads of five offices and state committees. The president was initiallyexpected to be chosen to five-year terms, serving a most extreme of two terms.
In March 1995, Karimov secured a 99 percent share in a rigged vote to expandhis term as president from the endorsed next race in. In 2002 choice expandedthe president’s term from five years to eight years. The executive branch ofgovernment is spoken to by the Cabinet of Ministers, which comprises of thePrime Minister, the prime minister’s deputy, the heads of services, governmentorganizations and bodies, and regions, and the head of legislature of theKarakalpakstan Autonomous Republic. The Cabinet of Ministers is formally headedby the Prime Minister; it is responsible to the President and the Parliament. Thissetup we can see why the executive branch holds all of the power within thegovernment of Uzbekistan.
With the judiciary lacking any independence to makechanges and with the legislature, whom hardly are ever available to meets, theexecutive branch overseen by the president, continues to make the decisions aroundthe laws and any major touchpoints that concern or are in interest of the country. The next branch of government is thelegislative system, which is represented by the Oliy Majilis or parliament thatrepresents the highest body in the country. Uzbekistan has a bicameralParliament which is chosen and designated for a five-year term. It comprises of,an Upper House or Senate with 100 individuals, 84 of whom are chosen by viloyatoverseeing gatherings (six from each division) and 16 of whom are designated bythe President; and a Lower House or Legislative Chamber with 150 individuals,who are chosen by well-known vote. In 2002 a submission supplanted theone-chamber Parliament with a bicameral council under the president’s control.
The old governing body, the Oliy Majlis (Supreme Assembly) had 150 individualswho served five-year terms. The governing body has little power. Individualsare picked in a procedure that keeps the resistance from partaking. Karimov’senergy in the parliament has been obvious in that body’s augmentation of thepresidential term of office from five to seven years in 2002 and by itselucidation that Karimov’s first term reached out from 1991 to 2000, empoweringhim to keep running for a “second” time. Following the two-roundparliamentary races of December 2004 and January 2005, the Oly Majlis includedindividuals from five political parties, which were all in favor of thegovernment. The third branch that we will look atis the Judicial, which is comprised of the Supreme Court, which has 34 judgesorganized into different sectors.
Then the constitutional court, which is madeof 7 judges and a higher economic court which contains 19 judges. Judge choiceand term of office: judges of the 3 most elevated courts selected by thepresident and affirmed by the Oliy Majlis; judges delegated for 5-year termssubject to reappointment. Uzbekistan ostensibly has an autonomous judicialbranch. Notwithstanding, practically speaking choices of the legal by and largetake after those of the Office of the Procuracy, the state prosecutorialorganization, and the president has the ability to delegate and evacuatejudges.
The national judiciary incorporates the Supreme Court, theConstitutional Court, and the High Economic Court. Lower court frameworks existat the provincial, locale, and town levels. Judges at all levels are named bythe president and affirmed by the Oly Majlis. Ostensibly free of alternatebranches of government, the courts stay under total control of the executivebranch. As in the arrangement of the Soviet time, the procurator general andhis local and nearby equivalents are both the state’s head arraigningauthorities and the main agents of criminal cases, a design that restrains therights of the prosecuted. In this presidential regime we cansee how the different branches of government relate to each other.
The overarching theme is that the president controls not only the executive branch butalso the judicial and legislative branches as well. The belief that the countryis looking for democratic reform is different than the actions that it istaking. The president has all of the power, which is extremely similar toRussia and in some cases even more openly authoritarian. Even in cases wherethere are opportunities to bring about change through laws and politicalparties, the president has a back door scenario in almost every case to eitheropenly deny the act or rely on his appointed members of the various branches todeny the act. There are still massive amounts of corruption and deceit in thepolitical landscape and the traits of a strong communist party beliefs arestill present and flourishing.
Even with the inclusion of multiple parties thegovernment continues to actively suppress their movements and openly banspublic meetings and demonstrations that are not sanctioned by the government.This oppression also flows over into various communication channels such asnewspapers, radio and television, which limits the amount of information thatis shared with the population. The development toward monetary change inUzbekistan has not been aligned with the development toward political change.The legislature of Uzbekistan has rather fixed its grasp since freedom in September1991, breaking down progressively on resistance gatherings. In spite of thefact that the names have changed, the establishments of government stay likethose that existed before the separation of the Soviet Union. The legislaturehas advocated its restriction of open get together, resistance parties, and themedia by stressing the requirement for security and a continuous way to dealwith change amid the transitional period, referring to the contention andtumult in the other previous.
This approach has discovered belief among a largepart of Uzbekistan’s population, albeit such a position may not be reasonableover the long haul. Looking atthe stability of the Uzbekistan government comes in two-fold. The first thingthat must be looked at is the current standing of the government.
In spite ofthe trappings of institutional change, the main years of autonomy saw moreprotection than acknowledgment of the institutional changes required for a democraticlaw based change to grab hold. Whatever underlying development toward democracyrules system existed in Uzbekistan in the beginning of freedom appears to havebeen overwhelmed by the dormancy of the staying Soviet-style solid broughttogether authority. This soviet style presence is still very strong and in thatessence the current government standing is stable. The authoritarian party willcontinue to take the lead and make changes as they see fit and the presidentsgrasp will not be able to be challenged, which seems to be aligned with whatthe majority wants. In looking at the future of the government and its desireto want to become more democratic will be necessary for any sort of long termsolution in the current global political landscape. Even in looking atcomparison on how the neighboring country of Kyrgyzstan has become moredemocratic and instilled the beliefs into the government, the relationshipbetween the two countries is constantly under turmoil. Due to this Uzbekistanis not overly concerned with what they are doing or seeing how it could be apotentially positive thing to bring about the change.
Overall, I do see thecurrent political regime as stable but the long term implications of thissoviet styled regime will not be stable and needs to change from the currentcorrupt system to a more democratic process.