Induction is a specific form of reasoning that takes us beyond the limits of existing evidence to conclusions about the unknown. The premises an inductive argument indicate some degree of support to the conclusion, but do necessarily entail the conclusion. The conclusion of an inductive argument is regarded as a hypothesis because the conclusion is said follow with probability. When we argue inductively, we infer something beyond the contents of the premises; hence this is referred to as the inductive leap. Inductive reasoning moves from specific cases and observations to more general underlying principles and hypothesis that explain them, for example, Einstein’s theory of relativity. Inductive reasoning is more open-ended and explanatory than deductive reasoning.Now David Hume’s problem of induction called into question a fallacy in which all science is based as brought up in the eighteenth century. It is the question, why does past experiences give us any reason at all to think that future experiences will be in a particular way, such as the laws of nature that appear to be more or less constant and does induction lead to knowledge and what is the justification for it?.Let’s consider the problem of the uniformity of nature. According to David Hume, induction is an unjustified form of reasoning for the following reason; one believes that inductions are good because nature is uniform in some deep respect. For instance, one induces all ravens are black from a small sample of black ravens because there is regularity of blackness among the ravens, which is a particular uniformity in nature. However, why suppose that there is a regularity of blackness among the ravens?, what justifies this assumption?. Hume asserts that one knows that nature is uniform either deductively or inductively, however, one admittedly cannot deduce this assumption and an attempt to induce the assumption only makes the justification of induction circular. Thus induction is an unjustified form of reasoning and as such, this is what makes induction a problem.Furthermore, inductive inference assumes that the past acts as a guide to the future, for example, if in the past it has rained 60% of the time given a conjunction of atmospheric condition arose, then it will probably rain 60% of the time in the future given a conjunction of similar conditions arises. But what justifies this?. Hume suggested two possible justifications, but rejected them both: the first justification states that, as a matter of logical necessity, the future must resemble past, but Hume notes that we cannot conceive an uncertain world because the future has nothing to do with the past. The justification, more modestly, appeals to the past succession of induction-it has worked in the past, so it will probably work in the future, but Hume points out, this justification uses circular reasoning in attempting to justify induction by reiterating it, thus this takes us back where we started.